The Events of the Coastal and Hama Massacres – Syrian Center Against Violence and Hatred

Prepared by the Center for Combating Violence and Hatred

Summary of Events:

The estimated number of civilian victims in the Syrian coastal region stands at approximately 1,700, a non-final toll that continues to rise due to the geographical spread of areas where massacres and violations have occurred, particularly in remote and scattered villages.

Since December 9, 2024, the Syrian coast has witnessed sectarian-motivated killings, in addition to kidnappings, arbitrary detentions, and verbal and physical abuses. One of the most frequently reported scenes involves citizens being forced to howl at checkpoints after their sectarian identity is revealed.

On March 6, security forces were targeted in Jableh and its countryside. In response, military and security forces launched direct retaliatory actions, including shelling and airstrikes on the villages of Dalia and Beit Ana.

The Alawite Islamic Council called for demonstrations, and a protest in Tartous was dispersed with live ammunition on the evening of Thursday, March 6. Meanwhile, protests took place in Homs, Damascus, and other areas, featuring sectarian slogans and verbal abuse toward Alawites, without any intervention from the authorities.

That same evening, youth groups mobilized in several villages in Jableh’s countryside—some seemingly organized, others spontaneous—armed with rifles, blocking main roads in their villages and besieging or taking over military posts. However, no command structure or communication network among them was observed.

The Ministry of Defense and General Security Forces declared a state of general mobilization, calling for popular mobilization through media outlets and mosques, urging civilians to take up arms and head to the coast in what was described as a jihad.

Few significant or intense battles occurred between factions and so-called “remnants” of armed groups, as these groups quickly dispersed and offered little to no resistance in the territories they had occupied.

Massacres and violations began with the entry into villages, starting from northern Hama countryside to northern Latakia, and from the city of Tartous to the villages of Baniyas, Qadmous, Jableh, and Qardaha.

Some factions operating under the Ministry of Defense adopted a strategy of indiscriminate sectarian killings and revenge. Entire villages and families—including children, women, and the elderly—were executed.

Artillery, tanks, and drones were used alongside intense, indiscriminate gunfire directed at villages prior to entry. Ministry of Defense personnel were reported chanting sectarian slogans and explicitly stating that they were targeting a specific sect.

The violations extended beyond people: homes, properties, cars, and water pumps were set on fire; electronic devices, computers, mobile phones, gold, and money were looted.

Massacres and violations continued even after the announcement of a fact-finding committee on September 3, and following the declaration of the end of military operations on October 3.

In some areas, such as the Al-Ramila neighborhood in Jableh’s countryside, corpses were left in the streets for up to a week without the possibility of proper burial.

As of the latest update to this report on February 4, sectarian-based killings persist. The most recent crime involved the murder of six individuals—including a 14-year-old boy—in the village of Harf Bnamra in the city of Baniyas. Violations at General Security checkpoints continue, including beatings, insults, arbitrary arrests, random killings, arson, theft, and sectarian questioning, such as “Are you Alawite?” followed by humiliation and abuse.

Continuation of Killings and Violations Following the Massacres — Until May 2, 2025

The intensity of mass killings subsided on March 10, 2025, yet various forms of crimes and violations have persisted up to the release date of this report, April 2, 2025:

Ongoing Sectarian Killings: Killings based on sectarian identity continue on main roads in the Syrian coast and the Hama countryside, lasting from December 10, 2024, through March 25, 2025. Some of these attacks involved the use of sharp weapons such as knives, particularly in western Hama countryside.
Arbitrary Killings and Detentions: Since March 7, thousands of civilians have been arbitrarily detained on a sectarian basis without legal warrants, trials, or access to family visits or legal representation. Some detainees are held in conventional detention centers like prisons and police stations, while others are imprisoned in homes or civilian buildings confiscated and converted into makeshift detention centers by certain factions.
Looting and Theft: Looting of homes and properties belonging to Alawites in the Syrian coast and western Hama continues, sometimes occurring while residents are still inside their homes. The latest documented incident of a home invasion with residents present was on March 23, 2025, in the village of Al-Ransiyah. The most recent documented case of sectarian car theft occurred on March 25, when an Alawite man driving a pickup truck carrying vegetables on the Homs-Tartous road was stopped at a checkpoint past Arzunah, forcibly removed from his vehicle, and had it stolen. Additional incidents have been reported since but remain undocumented.
Education Disruption: More than 100,000 school students in the Syrian coast and Hama countryside have been out of school since March 6 due to instability and a lack of safety. This figure is based on estimates provided by three responsible sources in the Ministry of Education.
Ongoing Intimidation and Random Gunfire: Intimidation tactics and random gunfire persist. The latest documented instance occurred in the Basanada neighborhood of Latakia on March 26, 2025, and prior to that in Dreikish on March 23.
Displacement and Denied Return: Residents forcibly displaced from western Hama countryside on March 7 have not been allowed to return. A documented assault on cemeteries in one of these villages occurred on March 31, 2025.
State Security Failures and Participation in Violations: Authorities have failed to ensure public safety, with their forces themselves often participating in illegal acts. For example, on March 11, homes in Al-Ramila village (Jableh countryside) were burned while only Ministry of Defense personnel were present. Similar incidents occurred the same day in the village of Al-Salata in Qardaha countryside.
Systematic Looting in Al-Mukhtariyah: As of March 19, Al-Mukhtariyah village in Latakia countryside experienced widespread house burnings, theft, and complete looting of homes. Looted items were transported east via the M4 highway through General Security checkpoints.
Targeted Thefts in Tartous: Continued sectarian-based home thefts have been documented in Tartous, the most recent involving the home of a journalist on March 25, 2025. Her husband had been killed on March 7, and she was forcibly displaced from her home, which was later looted.
Kidnappings and Disappearances: Dozens of cases of kidnappings and forced disappearances remain ongoing. The most recent occurred on March 24, involving a woman from Jableh who disappeared at the city’s transport terminal while attempting to transfer her daughter from a city school to a village school due to worsening security conditions.
Denial of Proper Burials: Families have been prevented from burying their victims with dignity. Authorities dug mass graves where bodies were buried in locations including Al-Shir, Barabshbo, Ain Al-Arous, Sanawbar Jableh, and Baniyas. In Arzah, families were prohibited from direct burials and had to rely on intermediaries (neighbors from nearby villages) to bury their dead.
Education Remains Suspended: Hundreds of schools in the coastal region remain closed, with no resumption of educational activities.
Displacement from Hmeimim Base: Displaced families who had taken refuge in or near the Hmeimim military base have not returned to their homes due to the ongoing lack of safety.
Mass Displacement to Lebanon: Thousands of Syrians continue to flee to Lebanon fearing sectarian violence and killings.

The Full Narrative of Events from March 6 to March 26, 2025 (Violations Ongoing):

On the afternoon of Thursday, March 6, 2025, several patrols arrived in the village of Beit Ana, located in the countryside of Jableh city, Latakia Governorate, with the intention of arresting a wanted individual. According to testimonies from local residents we interviewed, a verbal confrontation erupted between the patrol and the villagers, escalating into a standoff that ultimately prevented the arrest.

Residents expressed deep mistrust toward the transitional authorities due to the repeated occurrence of extrajudicial arrests, the disappearance of detainees, the absence of a fair judicial system, and the prevalence of summary executions. These experiences fueled the villagers’ resistance.

The patrols eventually withdrew without detaining the individual. However, as they exited the village, they were ambushed on its outskirts by armed groups identified as remnants of regime-affiliated forces, commonly referred to as “regime remnants” (fulool al-nizaam). The official news agency SANA reported the ambush, confirming one officer killed and another wounded, and announced the deployment of reinforcements and the siege of the villages of Dalia and Beit Ana.

Shortly thereafter, videos circulated on social media showing a military helicopter bombing the village of Dalia. The footage was verified, including its location. In Jableh city, residents heard six rocket shells being launched from the Naval Academy in the city toward the villages of Dalia and Beit Ana, approximately 20–30 km away from the launch site.

In response to the attacks, the Alawite Islamic Council called for demonstrations protesting the aerial and rocket bombardment of civilian villages. Demonstrations took place later that day in Latakia and Tartous. That evening, the protests were attacked, and live bullets were fired to disperse demonstrators on Thursday night, March 6.

Later that night, armed groups launched attacks on several General Security checkpoints and military sites, and some major roads were blocked, including the Hama–Latakia road (Al-Ghab), where an ambush targeting General Security forces resulted in casualties. Additionally, the Qadmous–Baniyas road was blocked. Two military positions were reportedly attacked: one at a checkpoint in Istamo (Jableh countryside), and the other at the Naval Academy in Jableh, which came under gunfire on the evening of March 6.

The Governor of Latakia later declared that the Naval Academy had been surrounded and thanked the soldiers stationed there for their “victory.” However, SANA, while reporting the arrival of military reinforcements on March 7, did not mention any clashes around the academy or any difficulties faced by the reinforcements en route.

Evening of March 6: Allegations of Leadership, Casualties, and General Mobilization

On the evening of March 6, various news outlets and social media pages began circulating claims implicating Colonel Ghiath Dalla, a former officer in the regime’s army, as being responsible for the attacks in the coastal region. Alleged posts and messages attributed to him were shared online. Some reports also linked Miqdad Fattouha, leader of a previously announced militia called “Coastal Shield (Dir’ al-Sahel)“, to the incidents. However, Dalla did not appear in any video, nor has any credible trace of his presence emerged. According to available information, he had disappeared on December 7, 2024, and his whereabouts remain unknown.

While no official figures have been released regarding the number of security personnel casualties in the coastal clashes, Al Jazeera, a network closely aligned with the transitional authorities, reported only 15 fatalities. In contrast, various unreliable sources circulated inconsistent and inflated numbers, some claiming hundreds of deaths, though no official body has confirmed or published an accurate toll. Our monitoring efforts recorded two documented funerals for General Security members killed in the coastal events: one in Idlib, where residents of Salqin buried their sons who had volunteered with the security forces, and the other in Hama, hometown of another group of fallen personnel.

The nature, structure, and pattern of these attacks suggest they were chaotic, uncoordinated raids—more akin to guerrilla-style hit-and-run tactics than organized military operations. These incidents lacked the use of heavy weaponry, strategic planning, or command hierarchy. Armed confrontations between clearly defined opposing sides had concluded by the afternoon of March 7, and military operations officially ended on March 10, with no notable resistance encountered during this time.

We have also documented negotiated agreements at several key points between attacking groups and General Security forces. These included safe evacuations for security personnel and non-violent handovers of detained officers. In several instances, detainees were released without any form of armed engagement.

Declaration of General Mobilization

On the evening of March 6, a nationwide state of general mobilization was declared. The Syrian Islamic Council, the highest religious authority in Syria at the time, issued a statement urging citizens to support the government’s call for mobilization:

“We urge all citizens to respond to the government’s call for general mobilization, offering their wealth and lives in the path of God, to confront this vile chaos.”

The statement concluded with a call to support and grant victory to the heroic mujahideen.

Religious Incitement, Mobilization, and Sectarian Escalation

Mosques across Damascus and other regions issued public calls for jihad, amplifying the religious framing of the conflict. In some cases, direct threats were made against specific villages prior to the atrocities committed there. A clear example occurred in Hama countryside, where Abu Jaber al-Khattabi, a known jihadist figure, issued explicit incitement against the village of Arzeh. The following day, during Friday prayers, he reiterated the incitement—shortly before masses of armed civilians and military personnel stormed the village and carried out a massacre against its inhabitants.

At the same time, pro-jihad demonstrations erupted in various parts of Syria, openly calling for attacks on the coast and featuring sectarian chants—yet authorities did not intervene to stop them. In stark contrast, a silent protest in Damascus condemning the massacres committed in the coastal region and the attacks on General Security forces was violently dispersed, in what appeared to be a sectarian-motivated crackdown. Despite the presence of security forces, no protection was provided to the civilians participating in the protest, and no attempt was made to prevent the assault against them.

Videos also emerged showing military convoys under the banner of the Ministry of Defense and General Security factions heading toward the coastal region, reportedly to confront the so-called “remnants” or “fugitive elements.” Simultaneously, civilians from central Syrian cities were armed and mobilized to join the offensive. Additionally, Sunni civilian groups in the coastal cities were also armed and encouraged to take part in the fighting.

According to pro-government sources and firsthand testimonies we obtained, civilians in Jableh, Latakia, and Baniyas actively fought alongside General Security forces in these confrontations—blurring the lines between state military action and sectarian civilian militias.

Entry into the Coastal Region and the Onset of Massacres (Beginning March 7, 2025)

Starting on the morning of March 7, the village of Al-Mukhtariyah, located approximately 15 km from Latakia, was the first area where massacres were documented. A total of 148 individuals were killed in this village alone, including women and minors under the age of 18, with all their names documented.

The killings in Al-Mukhtariyah were marked by systematic cruelty. Victims were executed in cold blood, sometimes gathered en masse before being killed, and sometimes murdered inside their homes. Before being killed, victims were subjected to humiliation and degradation—forced to howl like dogs, beaten with sticks, fists, and feet, and insulted with sectarian slurs targeting the Alawite community. After the killings, homes were looted and then burned.

The Massacres Spread Along Two Main Military Routes:
1. Idlib–Latakia Route
From Al-Mukhtariyah, the massacres moved to Al-Sheer, where 65 civilians were killed in similar fashion. The youngest was 14-year-old Fajr Nidal Martakoush, and the oldest was Kamel Rizq Al-Sheikh, 80. Several villagers remain missing as of March 16.

The campaign also affected Brabshbo, Al-Shalfatiyah, and Al-Shamiya, with similar sectarian mass killings.

2. The Latakia–Jableh Highway
Upon reaching the entrance to Latakia, the convoy split:

One branch entered Latakia city, specifically targeting the Daatour neighborhood, where 69 individuals were killed, including two women and a well-known religious cleric.

The second branch continued toward Jableh, breaking into smaller units that spread into multiple villages. Each left a trail of killings and destruction:

Sanawbar Jableh witnessed a massacre of 189 civilians, including children such as 15-year-old Yousef Mustafa.

In Ain Al-Arus, 88 people were killed, among them 10 women, 3 individuals with disabilities, and 9 children, murdered alongside their families. The attackers belonged to Islamist factions participating in the Ministry of Defense’s military campaign. Dozens are still missing.

In Qabou Al-Awamiyah, over 50 civilians were killed, and 120 homes were torched, including religious shrines of the Alawite sect.

One video showed Um Ayman Rayhan standing next to the bodies of her children and grandchild while receiving sectarian insults from the attackers.

A widely circulated image showed an armed fighter stepping on the body of her son, Suhail—a well-known educator, translator, and peace activist, killed solely for his sectarian identity. Despite the clarity of faces in the footage, no arrests have been made to date.

Other villages, such as Hamimim Al-Asaliyah and Al-Rumaylah, also suffered mass killings and widespread arson. Residents fled to the Hamimim military base, and despite official announcements that military operations ended on March 8, the burning of homes continued until at least March 12. These areas remain under the control of the Ministry of Defense and General Security forces.

Inside Jableh City
The situation in Jableh city was similarly dire. On Thursday evening, calls for jihad were broadcast from mosque minarets, and multiple eyewitnesses confirmed that Sunni civilians were armed by security forces.

Social media posts from community leaders in Jableh acknowledged that civilians were actively participating in combat alongside security services. Notably, a field hospital was established on March 6 near Abu Bakr Mosque, where even a local doctor reportedly took up arms and treated the wounded fighters.

These developments raise serious concerns about:

The neutrality of state institutions.

The arming of untrained civilians, which not only inflamed the conflict but also exposed them to harm.

The sectarian nature of the violence, where civilians were mobilized along religious lines and turned into active combatants in an already volatile environment.

Urban and Rural Violence in Jableh and Surroundings (March 7–9, 2025)

Limited Combat, Widespread Sectarian Killings

In Jableh city, armed clashes were extremely limited and concentrated on Friday night, involving confrontations with remnants of the former regime at locations such as Um Burghul Bridge and the Naval Academy. However, no significant engagements occurred after that night.

The massacres, in contrast, unfolded the next morning (Saturday, March 8) as military factions entered Jableh. These atrocities specifically targeted Alawite neighborhoods and were marked by sectarian motives.

Example: Massacre on Al-Furwah Street, Jableh

Entire families were murdered based on sectarian identity.
The family of retired lawyer Abdul Latif Ali (70) was killed in their home:
- His son Mujd, who had lost a hand 20 years ago.
- His other son Dr. Bashar.
- The family confirms they were killed after their sect was confirmed.

Indiscriminate Looting at First Entry

Initially, the attacking factions did not distinguish between residents, assuming the entire population to be non-Sunni. As a result:

Looting, vandalism, and arson occurred indiscriminately.
Sunni shopkeepers began writing “Sunni” on their storefronts in an attempt to avoid being targeted.

Violence Across Jableh’s Countryside

As military columns advanced through rural areas, they engaged in unprovoked attacks, shooting at homes without any prior fire from those locations.

Civilians along the route were:
- Shot arbitrarily.
- Targeted for looting and property destruction.

Example: Ra’s Al-Ayn (March 8)

The convoy looted a restaurant, smashed its glass, and destroyed its interior.
The owner posted a verified video showing the aftermath.

Example: Al-Maksaha

Ali A., an orphan exempt from military service caring for two disabled siblings, was killed with his cousin, both targeted based on sectarian identity.

Shift in Behavior After March 9

Beginning with Qasabin village on the Jableh–Hama (Al-Ghab) route, a decline in mass atrocities was observed.
Starting March 9, there was a noticeable reduction in large-scale massacres, though individual killings and abuses continued.

Sectarian Massacre in Qarfis Village

Located in Jableh’s rural surroundings, Qarfis village witnessed one of the most devastating incidents:

29 civilians were killed, including:
- Entire families, such as Yasser Suleiman (67) and his sons Ammar and Ahmad.
- Two elderly men: Mohsen Abboud and Fouad Ma’la, both in their seventies.

Additional Violations:

A military faction entering from Baniyas passed through Qarfis.
They vandalized the shrine of Sheikh Ahmad of Qarfis, an Alawite religious figure.
They stormed the home of sports journalist Aksem Doba, owner of Al-Riyadiya newspaper and nephew of General Ali Doba, a Ba’ath regime figurehead. Aksem and two of his staff were executed in his home.
Several homes were torched, and cars stolen.
The same group cut water supplies to the coastal region by disabling pumps at the Ayn Al-Sinn water station, which had been functioning prior to their arrival.

The convoys coming through the Homs–Tartous highway

The other convoys passed through the Homs–Tartous highway, and this does not mean they came only from Homs. According to our tracking, they came from Al-Rastan, from Rural Damascus, from Hama and Homs as well, in addition to other areas.

The convoys also distributed themselves across villages on their way to Tartous, and the first station a convoy turned towards was the villages of Arzouna and Karto, which witnessed collective and random killings in the two villages. We documented killings inside homes and on roads, in addition to the kidnapping of dozens. The violations are still ongoing in the area in different forms and on a sectarian basis. We recorded on March 23 acts of looting and theft on a sectarian basis that targeted the village of Al-Ransiyah. According to the testimonies we obtained and verification operations, valuable items such as gold and phones, including children’s phones, were stolen.

The rest of the convoys continued towards the cities of Tartous and Baniyas, where we documented specific violations in Tartous consisting of systematic harm in terms of burning and destroying property for sectarian reasons, in addition to theft operations, some of which are documented with surveillance cameras from inside the attacked shops.

Baniyas – The Genocide of Families Because They Are Alawites

The situation in Baniyas was completely different from Tartous, as the city witnessed significant sectarian mobilization and calls for jihad in it on the evening of Thursday, March 6, in addition to testimonies confirming the distribution of weapons to some civilians who belong to the Sunni sect by the transitional authorities, which places the authorities before doubled responsibility for the bloody events that the city witnessed.

The city of Baniyas witnessed collective killings on a sectarian basis that targeted entire families because they were Alawite, especially in the Al-Qusour neighborhood, which witnessed massacres that shame humanity in terms of killing entire families including the father, mother, and children because they are Alawites. The massacres in Al-Qusour neighborhood are still not fully documented, as some families were entirely killed and no one remained from them, and their bodies were moved from their homes, in addition to the presence of missing persons whose fate is unknown.

But the pattern of crimes in Baniyas in general, and in the Al-Qusour neighborhood in particular, was focused on the genocide of entire families. According to what we were able to document in a difficult and high-risk working environment, the factions that entered the neighborhood were searching for the homes of Alawites, some of whom managed to take refuge in the homes of their Sunni neighbors for protection. Meanwhile, the family of Dr. Bassam Sabbagh did not succeed in finding a place to take refuge, so they sheltered in the house along with their neighbors’ family. The factions entered their home, and the last communication between Dr. Bassam and his relatives was just minutes before the factions entered his house, where he said they had started chanting “Allahu Akbar” in the neighborhood and had gone up the building. After that, contact with him and all members of the family and their neighbors was lost. It was later revealed that he was killed in the house along with his wife Dr. Ruba, his son Dr. Haidara, and his younger brother Ward, a young child. No one survived from the family of Dr. Hussein Mohammad — the father, mother, and three children were all killed. The family of engineer Kmeit Salman was also killed, along with his wife and son, and many other families.

Moreover, the bodies of the victims in Al-Qusour neighborhood remained in the homes and streets for days before they were transferred by the Civil Defense. The residents who had fled the neighborhood did not return to their homes even after about three weeks since the massacres, as safety factors are still absent.

In addition to the massacres, the neighborhood witnessed acts of arson, looting, and theft that targeted homes, commercial shops, establishments, etc.

In contrast, no casualties were recorded among the General Security and the security apparatus in the city of Baniyas, which indicates that no clashes took place in the city with what are called remnants of the regime.

According to testimonies from residents of Al-Qusour neighborhood, they saw people in civilian clothing carrying weapons alongside factions wearing full military uniforms and vests, some of them wearing headbands with “La ilaha illa Allah” (There is no god but Allah) written on them. They also saw foreign fighters, identified by their accents — Egyptian, Iraqi, Tunisian — and some looked Caucasian. Some wore headbands that read “Al-Muhajireen” (the migrants). We also received testimonies indicating the participation of the “Abu Al-Fadl” faction in entering Al-Qusour neighborhood, which witnessed sectarian-based mass killings.

Crimes in the villages along the Baniyas–Al-Qadmous road

From Baniyas, convoys departed toward Al-Qadmous on March 8, and during their passage, they went through several villages, leaving their mark in each village.

The methodology of the factions’ movement relied on heavy gunfire from afar toward the village or its surroundings, as well as toward the surrounding woods, in a clear random targeting that included the use of drones, tanks, and 23 mm cannons.

After that, they would enter the villages, and burning operations would begin. We documented the burning of homes, commercial shops, and pharmacies, even if the village was empty of people. In the village of Barmaya, which was subjected to deliberate sabotage, the residents had fled beforehand to the woods after receiving news of what happened in the Al-Qusour neighborhood. There, among the forests and wild animals, they found some of the safety that was lost in their homes.

Barmaya: On Saturday, March 8, in the afternoon, a convoy left Baniyas toward Al-Qadmous. Some said that among the moving factions was a faction called “Al-Rahman” — that is how it identified itself.

They began shooting from the moment they entered the village — toward homes, shops, and the woods surrounding the road. Drones and heavy weapons, including the 23 mm machine gun, were used. A source confirms that several victims died due to being hit by flying wooden splinters as a result of the gunfire hitting the woods, and due to the delay in medical aid.

The attackers in Barmaya wrote phrases on the walls such as “Lions of Al-Ghab,” “May God curse you, worshipers of the cross,” “We came to you with slaughter,” and “From here passed the Hama people — we crushed you.”

So far, 22 people have been confirmed dead in Barmaya. They were buried in two groups in the Sheikh Ali and Sheikh Firas Al-Din cemeteries, in the presence of General Security, with photography and any burial rituals being forbidden.

A source confirms the presence of General Security elements inside the village during the assault. He also confirms, after contacting one of the General Security elements to ask them to stop firing at the woods, that they were ordered to shoot at any light appearing in the woods at night because those were remnants of the fleeing regime — although in reality, those in the woods were the villagers.

Al-Hataniya: On Sunday, March 9, 2025, the village of Al-Hataniya was stormed from the direction of the village of Asqibla after the convoy had settled there overnight.

The attack on the village began with all types of light and heavy weapons, from small arms to tanks, along with heavy gunfire directed at the woods where the village residents had taken refuge, fearing the reports of killing, burning, and destruction carried out by these forces in a brutal manner.

When the convoy reached one of the shrines, they found a group of young men who had hidden near the shrine, and they immediately killed them before continuing into the village.

Fourteen civilian martyrs were documented, along with several wounded.

The shelling and gunfire continued from 9:00 AM until 3:00 PM.

When the villagers learned that the attackers had left, some of the residents returned to see what had happened to their homes. They were shocked by the extent of the destruction, fires, and damage. All the damages were documented, and they include 55 homes completely burned and 34 homes partially burned and damaged.

Hammam Wasel:

On Sunday, March 9, 2025, the convoy of the General Security forces was present in the town of Qadmous in the afternoon. However, a military convoy entered the village of Hammam Wasel from the only road leading from Qadmous. The residents had already evacuated, and the convoy began indiscriminate shelling with heavy weapons, burning homes. Forty homes were reported to have been burned, and one victim was documented. The shelling continued for about an hour and a half.

Hama Countryside: The Spiritual Leader of the Alawite Sect Sheikh Shaban Al-Mansour Killed at the Age of 80

On the other hand, the northern countryside of Hama, located on the Idlib-Latakia road, witnessed no attack by the so-called remnants of the regime, nor did any armed element from the local population participate. However, the area’s villages were targeted by military factions that were part of the Ministry of Defense campaign along with volunteer groups. Among the targeted villages were Arza, and the line of villages extending from Salhab, to Deir Shemeil, Bostan Al-Fandara, and Al-Tun.

In Arza, Abu Jaber Al-Khatabi called on the villagers to leave for the Syrian coast on Thursday night. The following day, after Friday prayers, the gathered crowds were directed towards the village. Civilian groups crossed through the General Security checkpoint, which did not stop them or defend the Alawite village at all. The attackers killed 30 people, looted homes, and set some of them on fire.

It is worth mentioning that the village had already been subjected to a sectarian massacre at the end of January 2025 when armed groups attacked the village and killed 8 of its residents on a sectarian basis, including a 17-year-old minor and a young man with special needs suffering from eye problems.

As of today, March 25, the residents of Arza have not returned to their homes, and they were all displaced. Authorities placed signs on some of the houses in the village, some of which were marked as “Property of Ahrar Al-Sham” and others as “Property of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham.”

In the town of Salhab in the Hama countryside, the village witnessed the entry of armed factions on the evening of Thursday, March 6. The village had been quiet before the factions’ entry and had not witnessed any movement against the authorities.

In Salhab, 14 civilians were killed in cold blood in front of their families. Some were killed immediately, and others were killed after being arrested by factions affiliated with the transitional authorities or those involved in its operations.

Among the victims in Salhab was the spiritual leader of the Alawite sect, Sheikh Shaban Al-Mansour, who was 80 years old.

Sheikh Shaban’s house was stormed around 9:30 AM on Friday, March 7, by a military group that entered with Ministry of Defense forces. They entered the room where Sheikh Shaban was, and he was bedridden, unable to move.

When the armed men entered his room, they told him, “Pretend you’re asleep.” He truly was asleep due to his age and health problems, having recently undergone a brain surgery (due to a clot) and another surgery on his thigh. He could not walk without the support of his sons.

Two members of the group carried Sheikh Shaban out of his home, and all of his sons and grandchildren were lying on the ground, being struck with the butt of rifles. Gunfire was exchanged to intimidate them.

While they were taking the Sheikh, his son Hussein attempted to stop them by crawling to the door to block their exit. They started beating him, then shot him twice.

They carried the Sheikh over his injured son and took him away in their car. His body was later found in agricultural land to the left of the road leading from Sheikh Shaban’s house to the heart of Salhab, with three gunshot wounds.

Hussein, who had been shot twice, was still alive when the factions left the house. However, when they tried to get him medical help, they were prevented from doing so for about two and a half hours. After the factions left the area, his family was able to take him to Al-Mahrada Hospital, where he died before reaching the hospital, having bled for about three hours in front of his family, unable to receive help.

Sheikh Shaban Al-Mansour was well-known for his charitable works, including contributing to the construction of a charitable hospital in Hama countryside. He was also famous for saying, “I will never tolerate human humiliation, and I will defend against it if I can… even if I suffer harm, I forgive.”

After leaving Salhab, the factions moved towards Deir Shemeil, Asila, Al-Tawima, and Al-Rasafa, committing massacres of mass killings and extrajudicial executions in the villages they passed through on March 7, 8, 9, and 10, before the mass killings declined and turned into individual cases of ongoing violations up until today.

In the western countryside of Hama, Alawite civilians were killed because they were Alawites. In the village of Al-Rasafa, for example, more than 61 people were killed, including 5 children, 3 university students aged 20, 3 people with special needs, and 2 women. Entire families were also killed, such as the family of Haydar As’ad, 65, who was killed along with his son and brothers, totaling 6 individuals.

In the village of Al-Tawima, where dozens of locals were killed in cold blood, there was a clear focus on killing children, with 14 children documented as being killed, some as young as five years old.

Analysis and Recommendations

Since the liberation of Syria from the Assad regime on January 8, 2024, the Alawite community has expressed openness towards the new state, showing their support in various ways. The most prominent display of this engagement has been their backing of the new authority through support statements, participating in reconciliation centers, and surrendering weapons by those who had been part of the regime’s army and security forces. Tens of thousands of Alawites have come forward to regularize their situation at these centers, despite the legitimate fears stemming from the background of jihadist factions within the transitional authorities.

However, the authorities have adopted an exclusionary approach towards the Alawites, similar to their treatment of other Syrian sects. When the Alawites protested the burning of the Alawite religious leader Al-Khaseibi’s shrine, their protests were met with excessive violence, particularly in Homs, where widespread violations occurred against the Alawite community in December 2024. Despite this, the Alawites remained open to the authorities, which responded with broad dismissals of Alawite employees from state institutions along the Syrian coast. The authorities also dismissed all female employees related to victims who were conscripted into the regime’s war effort, leaving widows and orphans without income, which demonstrates a clear abandonment of state responsibility and the implementation of collective punishment for past affiliations.

The authorities have also followed a policy of appointing individuals from a single group (mainly from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and their allies in Idlib), assigning them to political, security, and economic roles, as well as managing state institutions. For example, there are reports of individuals from Idlib being appointed as managers of hospitals in coastal cities, a clear disregard for local expertise and competence.

There has been no consideration of the unique social customs and culture of the Syrian coast, which is generally closer to secularism. The authorities have appointed extremists and foreign security officials who have committed widespread violations against civilians, including sectarian discrimination, insulting Alawites during checkpoint stops, and even in their villages. These violations have been documented in videos.

Furthermore, the authorities have allowed jihadist ideological movements to freely roam the coastal areas, calling for the wearing of the full hijab for Alawite women, thus interfering with their rights and freedoms regarding clothing, which contrasts with the relative freedom enjoyed by women in Alawite culture.

The authorities have failed to intervene to stop the widespread hate speech against Alawites, which has manifested in various forms on social media and in the media outlets affiliated with or close to the government. The rhetoric even reached the level of accusation, as exemplified by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shabani’s statement at the 2025 Brussels Conference on Syria, where he publicly blamed the Alawites for ruling Syria for 54 years, contributing to the deaths and displacement of millions. This statement, made even after the massacres in the coastal region, highlights the regime’s failure to revise its rhetoric and adopt a discourse that promotes national reconciliation rather than fueling sectarianism.

After the massacres in the coastal region, the authorities formed an investigation committee, yet the Alawites and other groups were excluded from the committee. The lack of trust in this committee, which is made up entirely of individuals with one political orientation, has prevented victims’ families from feeling safe enough to testify.

The authorities have persistently promoted the narrative that remnants of the Assad regime were responsible for the killings of civilians in the coastal region, a narrative that overlooks crucial evidence, such as videos and reports showing the perpetrators themselves carrying out the massacres.

The authorities also formed a national reconciliation committee, but it was exclusively composed of individuals loyal to the President, including military officials. This has further weakened the credibility and effectiveness of the committee, marginalizing the Alawite community and the people of the coastal region.

Additionally, the government has created security and military forces that exclusively represent one group, rejecting Alawites who wanted to volunteer for the public security forces. This has created a divide between local communities and the security apparatus in the coastal region.

The President has conducted meetings with representatives from various regions and sects but has intentionally excluded the Alawites, denying their existence and representation in the political process. Similarly, a National Dialogue Conference was organized, yet the representation of the Alawites was minimal, with only two individuals participating, neither of whom have any substantial grassroots support or community backing.

Members of the military campaign led by the Ministry of Defense in the coastal region have openly expressed sectarian views, with documented insults that reveal a lack of neutrality in the military institution and its failure to uphold national values.

Furthermore, the authorities have relied on media personnel who accompanied the military operations and engaged in unethical and professional misconduct in their coverage of events in the coastal region.

Recommendations:

Immediate cessation of violations in the coastal region in all forms—whether political, social, or military.
Expulsion of foreign forces from the coastal region, ensuring that only Syrian forces, representative of all communities, are stationed there.
Reintegration of Syrian military forces back into their original barracks, ensuring their role is strictly defensive and not politically motivated.
Initiate direct dialogue with the local communities in the coastal region and all Syrian communities to foster understanding and cooperation.
Combat hate speech in all its forms, and ensure that authorities adopt a national discourse that focuses on societal peace and unity, rather than sectarian rhetoric.
Respect the cultural and societal uniqueness of the coastal region, protecting the rights of Alawite women, such as freedom of dress, and curbing external ideological pressures, including extremist calls for women to wear the hijab.
Rebuild state institutions with a focus on national identity, free from sectarianism, and revamp the security apparatus to ensure inclusivity and neutrality.
Adopt a decentralized governance model, empowering local communities to manage their own affairs, ensuring adequate representation at both the local and central levels.
Establish local police forces in the coastal region, composed of local residents, who will be responsible for maintaining security while respecting local cultural and religious norms.
Send urgent humanitarian aid to the coastal region, addressing immediate needs and assisting displaced people.
Allow the entry of human rights and humanitarian organizations to assess the situation and provide assistance to the people.
Permit the entry of impartial media outlets to monitor the situation and provide an unbiased view of the ongoing situation.
Send impartial observers to the coastal region to monitor violations and support efforts to halt them.

How International Law Views the Crimes Committed in Syria

According to international law, the crimes outlined in the report can be classified under several categories based on international human rights and humanitarian law treaties. These crimes fall into main types such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and racial and sectarian discrimination. Below are the legal characterizations according to the relevant treaties and international conventions:

1. War Crimes:

Key Treaty: Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols.

Legal Characterization:

Indiscriminate or Targeted Killing of Civilians: This constitutes a clear violation of international humanitarian law, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Additionally, the First Additional Protocol of 1977 prohibits attacks that do not distinguish between military and civilian targets.

Torture and Inhumane Treatment: Torture and cruel treatment are violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit the cruel, degrading, or inhumane treatment of any person, whether a prisoner of war or a civilian.

Excessive Destruction of Civilian Property: Violates Article 53 of the First Additional Protocol, which prohibits the destruction of civilian property without military necessity.

Forcible Displacement of the Population: According to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the forced displacement of civilians is considered a war crime if carried out for unjustified reasons, such as retaliation or collective punishment — as seen in Arza.

Racial and Sectarian Discrimination: Discrimination based on sect or religion by threatening civilians or depriving them of their fundamental rights constitutes a violation of Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits discrimination against civilians on religious, racial, or sectarian grounds.

2. Crimes Against Humanity:

Key Treaty: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998).

Legal Characterization:

Killing, Torture, and Inhumane Treatment: Deliberate killing and torture are considered crimes against humanity when committed on a widespread or systematic basis against civilians. According to Article 7 of the Rome Statute, killing and torture qualify as crimes against humanity when carried out as part of a state or armed group policy.

Mass Persecution: Including sectarian or religious persecution, this constitutes a crime against humanity under Article 7(h) of the Rome Statute, which defines persecution as systematic attacks against individuals based on their ethnic or religious identity.

Exposure to Torture and Cruel Treatment: Torture and cruel treatment qualify as crimes against humanity if carried out systematically and on a large scale against civilians in accordance with Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

Arbitrary Detention and Enforced Disappearance: Enforced disappearance, which involves kidnapping individuals and detaining them in unknown locations, constitutes a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(i) of the Statute.

3. Racial and Sectarian Discrimination:

Key Treaty: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965).

Legal Characterization:

Sectarian Discrimination and Threats to Minority Rights: If certain parties are incited against the Alawite community or marginalized, this may constitute racial or sectarian discrimination under Article 1 of the Convention.

Incitement to Racial or Religious Hatred: Inciting sectarian hatred and promoting violence against a religious or ethnic group is a clear violation of the Convention, which prohibits all forms of racial discrimination, including those based on religion and sect.

4. Incitement to Hatred and Violence:

Key Treaty: United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and International Human Rights Law.

Legal Characterization:

Incitement to Hatred: Inciting hatred or calling for sectarian violence is a crime under Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which includes the prohibition of advocacy of violence or hatred that leads to the destruction of others’ rights.

Incitement to Violence Against Minorities: Inciting violence against Alawites or any other religious group is considered a crime under international human rights law, and those responsible for such incitement must be held accountable.

Legal Conclusion:

The crimes outlined in the report range from war crimes to crimes against humanity and racial and sectarian discrimination, all of which are prohibited under several international treaties, including the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their protocols, the Rome Statute (1998) of the International Criminal Court, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965). These crimes necessitate the accountability of those responsible at both the national and international levels, and they must be brought to justice in a competent court under international law.